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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LILLIAK FOX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.- Case No. 9122 
ROSS N. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff's staten1ent of the facts fails to give the 
cmnplete picture. Therefore, we make our own statement. 
The accident occurred on September 30, 1958, at 
about 7 :-1-3 A.~L at approximately 1028 East 5th South 
in Salt Lake City, "L-:-tah, (R. 21-22, 28). It was undisputed 
that extending along 5th South Street from 11th East all 
the way down to lOth East there was a solid island in the 
center of the street separating eastbound traffic frmu 
westbound traffic, (R. 30, 51, 64-65; also diagram, Exhibit 
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P-4 and photos, D-5, D-6, D-7 and D-8). By reference to 
the diagrmn, Exhibit P-4, the curbs on either side of thP 
island were 5 inches high and the width of the island 
at the approxin1ate point of the accident was 5 or 6 feet. 
[t was further undisputed that at the· place where the 
plaintiff was crossing the street there was no marked 
pedestrian lane, ( R. 29, 51, 65). In his brief counsel re-
fers to two points shown on the diagrmn, Exhibit P-4, 
~aid points being 1narked as C-1 and C -2. In describing 
the course of the defendant's vehicle, counsel states that 
the defendant continued to point C-1 and then on to C-~. 
In the course of his argun1ent counsel implies that the 
defendant changed lanes from the point C-1 to the point 
C-2. This is not true. Now here in the defendant's testi-
uwny did he testify as to point C-1 or C-2, and nowhere 
in his testiinony did he indicate that he had proceeded for 
any distance in the outside lane. His testi1nony was clear 
that when he Inade his turn, he proceeded directly into 
the inside lane for eastbound traffic (R. 111). Points 
C-1 and C-2 were placed upon the diagrmn by the defend-
ant's witness, l\I yer, in connection with his cross-examina-
tion. 1\fyer was asked whether there were any other east-
bound aut01nobiles in the vicinity, and referred to an 
eastbound vehicle sorne distance behind the defendant's 
B-,ord car. The point C-1 was to indicate where this un-
identified eastbound car was on the road at the time that 
the defendant's car was at the point indicated on the dia-
gram by G-2, (R. 83-84). 
Koneta Court is a small eourt that intersects 5th 
South Street from the south only. At the point where it 
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enters 5th Houth Street it is no wider than a driveway 
or approxilnately 12 feet in width, (R. 65-66, diagram~ 
Exhibit P-4, photos, Exhibit D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8). There 
was a marked crosswalk across 5th South up at the inter-
section of 11th East, ( R. 29). There were no sidewalks 
extending out to the south curb line frmn either side of 
Koneta Court. By reference to the diagram and the 
photographs aforernentioned, it will be observed that 
Barbara Place intersects 5th South Street frmn the north 
only. By using the scale on the diagram, Barbara PlacP 
would be located approxin1ately 15 feet east of Koneta 
Court. Also, by reference to the diagrarn and photo-
graphs aforernentioned it will be observed that Isabella 
Court intersected 5th South fron1 the south only, and 
again by reference to the scale on the diagran1, this court 
v\·ould be located approximately 80 feet east of Koneta 
Court and approxirnately 10 feet east of Barbara Place. 
As indicated b~.· the photographs and the diagrarn, it like-
wise is no wider than a private driveway, (Exhibits P -4~ 
D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8). 
The plaintiff was ernployed as a clairns secretary for 
the American Surety Cmnpany, (R. 20). She resided on 
the south side of 5th South Street just west of Koneta 
Court, (R. 21). Jacobs, another employee of the Ameri-
ran Surety Cornpany, with whom the plaintiff was ac-
<luainted, had been picking up plaintiff and taking her to 
"·ork 5 days a week for severalrnonths before the acci-
dent. He always called for her about 7 :45 A.~f. Another 
employee, ~I ildred Peters, was in the car with hin1 on 
these occasions. He always stopped in Barbara Place 
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headed west, pulling completely off the traveled portion 
of 5th South Street, (R. 30, 31, 50, 63). 
The plaintiff had lived on that street for approxi-
lnately 9 years and was very familiar with the traffic 
particularly at 7:45 A.M., (R. 28). As a n1atter of fact, 
she testified that she always had to take precautions be-
cause it was a busy street, (R. 23). She also testified 
that it was very heavily traveled at that ti1ne of the 
morning, (R. 28). 
Miss Peters testified that she custmnarily found at 
that time of the day there was a lot of traffic going both 
east and west along 5th South Street, (R. 51, 52). 
Jacobs testified that there was heavy traffic proceed-
ing both east and west at that time of the Inorning, east-
bound traffic going to the University, and westbound 
traffic coming into town, (R. 64). Both Peters and 
Jacobs testified that because of the heavy traffic, they 
always moved off 5th South Street and parked in the 
driveway at Barbara Place, (R. 50, 64). Both Peters 
and Jacobs further testified that on one or two occasion~ 
prior to the automobile accident they had discussed the 
hazard of crossing the street with the plaintiff, and that 
Jacobs had offered to drive around the block and come 
back headed east on 5th South Street so as to pick her up 
on the south side of the street in front of her home and 
thereby make it unnecessary for her to cross the street 
in heavy traffic. However, the plaintiff had said that 
this was not necessary, (R. 52, 53, 54, 66, 67). The plain-
tiff was, of course, fully aware o£ the heavy traffic by 
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reason of having crossed the street for several 1nonths 
before at that time of the day and having lived on the 
street for nine years. However, in addition she testified 
that 5th South Street was "a very heavily traveled 
street," (R. 28). 
The plaintiff testified that she had always crossed 
the street at this particular tin1e and place. On the Inorn-
ing of the accident she left the front door of her house, 
walked down the driveway of l(oneta Court to the ditch 
on the south side of the street, and then looked to the 
·west for approaching eastbound traffic, (R. 31, 32). Shr 
said that the boulevard was clear except for one car which 
was down by the Custmn Furniture, or about three-
quarters of a block away. At that time the car had not 
reached the curve, and she was not sure whether it would 
make the curve or go south on lOth East, (R. 32-33). 
She had no idea as to the make of the car or how fast it 
was traveling, (R. 33). From the time she made thi.s 
observation when standing in the ditch on Koneta Court 
on the south side of the street she then "walked rapidly 
across the street." She did not see the automobile again 
and was not conscious of its approach until the moment 
of the impact. As a 1natter of fact, she admitted that 
after making her observation 'vhile at the south curb or 
ditch line of 5th South Street, she did not look again for 
eastbound cars as she crossed the street, ( R. 34-35). 
There was considerable dispute in the evidence as to 
just where the plaintiff was in the street when she was 
struck by the car. According to her testimony, she was 
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just stepping onto the island when the accident occurred, 
(R. 22) ; yet, she admitted that the car did not go onto 
the island to strike her, ( R. 36). ~\fter the accident, she 
admitted that she \vas lying with her feet just onto the 
island and the rest of her body just south of the island, 
(R. 36). 
Miss Peters testified that she ~aw Fox come out the 
front door and start down the front steps of her horne, 
then she turned away to open the right front door, (R. 
4:2), and did not thereafter see the plaintiff until just a 
split second before the accident occurred, (R. 54). At 
this ti1ne the car was very close to her, and she saw one 
leg extending out, but wouldn't want to say whether 1t 
was on the island or not. She had no opinion as to how 
far the left side of the car was at the time she observed it 
frmn the south edge of the island and had no idea at all 
as to its speed. She did observe, however, that the plain-
tiff rolled off the left side of the fender over toward the 
left of the car, (R. 55, 56). The car itself did not go up 
onto the island. The plaintiff when she cmne to rest was 
about 6 feet frmn the point of i1npact. She observed one 
of the plaintiff's shoes on the line dividing the two lanes 
for eastbound traffic and also observed the plaintiff's 
purse about 6 feet southeast of the island, (R. 56, 57, 58). 
J.acobs testified that while he was stopped in Bar-
bara Place on the 1norning of the accident he sa}V the 
plaintiff leave her front door, come down to Koneta 
Court at the south side of 5th South, where she waited 
1nomentarily and looked westward down the street, and 
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then "began to hurry across the street," and ·was ahnost 
to the center island when struck by the autornobile, (R. 
61). When he first observed the car, it was about 20 feet 
away frmn the plaintiff, (R. 62), and its left wheels were 
approximately one and one-half to two feet south of the 
island, (R. 63). He said that when she started to eros~ 
the street she proceeded in a general northeasterly direc-
tion toward his parked car, (H. 68-70). He estirnated 
the speed of the car in the "neighborhood of approxi-
mately 30 utiles an hour," (R. 70-71), and said that lw 
had observed frmn previous occasions that that was the 
speed at whieh cars at that tirne of the rnorning going 
east on 5th South generally traveled, (R. 74). He further 
testified that front the tirne the plaintiff started across 
the street until the n1ornent of the accident she was hurry-
ing and was still moving at the time of the aecident. He 
said that when she carne in contact with the car, she went 
over the left front fender and off to the left side of the 
car, and after the accident was lying not rnore than 8 or 
10 feet from the point of irnpact, (R. 71). 
Clifford 1Iyer, an employee of the Utah State Road 
Commission, was with a survey crew that was working 
in the area at the time of the aceident. He was do·wn by 
the retaining wall at lOth East and 5th South approxi-
mately on the center line of 5th South Street looking east 
along said 5th South Street. He had been making sonte 
shots with another state employee who was in the center 
of 5th South Street, but up at the 11th East intersection, 
(R. 76-77). He indicated his position by a little "m" on 
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hours of 7 :00 A.M. and 8 :00 A.:.M. 5th South Street was 
heavily traveled. 
vVhile looking east along the center of 5th South 
Street he heard a screeching sound and then observed 
the defendant's car and a black object as it rolled off the 
side of the left front fender. From where he was sighting 
he testified that the left wheels of the defendant's car 
were 4-6 feet south of the center island, (R. 77-78). The 
car was swerving to the right and carne to a stop very 
quickly. It stopped within half the distance of the car, 
(R. 79). He had casually observed the car before and said 
it was not going nearly as fast as the traffic cmning 
down the street, (R. 79). Following the accident the 
plaintiff was lying a foot and a half south of the island, 
(R. 79). 
\V esley C. Larson also testified on behalf of the de-
fendant. He was the men1ber of the survey crew that was 
in the center of 5th South Street but up at 11th East 
Street and looking down west toward iliyer, (R. 86-87). 
He heard the brakes and then observed that the plaintiff 
was between the ornmnent in the center of the car and the 
left front fender. The left side of the car at this time 
was 4 feet south of the center island. The car stopped 
very fast and did not travel over a car length, (R. 88). 
Following the accident, the plaintiff was lying about 3 
feet south of the island. He went down to the scene and 
observed the brake marks fr01n the defendant's car which 
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he estimated to be about 12 feet long from the rear of the 
car, (R. 89-90). 
Sidney LeSieur was another 1nember of the survey 
crew who testified on behalf of the defendant. He was 
standing right next to Myer on the line with the center 
of 5th South Street but down at lOth East, (R. 91-92). 
He heard the screech of brakes. The only thing that he 
observed was the position of the plaintiff after the accj-
dent and the location of one of her shoes. She was lying 
approximately 3 feet south of the island with no part 
of her body on the island. He observed a shoe about 5 or 
G feet southeasterly of the plaintiff, and 11 feet south 
of the island, or about on the line dividing the two lane~ 
for eastbound traffic. He did observe so1ne skid marks 
caused by the defendant's car and estimated that they 
were only 10-12 feet long up to the point where the rear 
end of the car 'vas after the accident, (R. 92-93). He also 
said that the particular area where the accident occurred 
was awfully bad for traffic, and that the me1nbers of 
the survey crew wouldn't dare go out onto the street 
without a red vest on, (R. 95). He said the only warning 
signs to indicate any survey crewmen were in the area 
would be further south on lOth East Street from the 
point where the defendant had entered lOth East Street. 
~one of the crewmen were in the street in the vicinity 
where the accident occurred, (R. 94). 
Proctor Lescoe, the investigating officer, was also 
called as a witness for the defense. He arrived on the 
scene at 7:51 A.l\1., (R. 97). According to his measure-
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1nents, the plaintiff's feet were 6 inches frmn the south 
edge of the island, and her head :2 feet frmn the south 
edge of the island. No part of her body was on the island, 
(R. 98-99). She was lying approximately 19 feet east of 
the east edge of Koneta Court. l-Ie observed brake marks 
eaused from all four wheels of the defendant's car and 
measured thmn to be 17 feet long. The car itself had been 
moved from the point where it had cmne to rest and was 
facing in a northeasterly direction, (R. 99-100). There 
was no broken glass on the car and no visible damage to 
it, (R.lOl). 
Ross Taylor, the defendant, testified that he was 
attending the lTniversity at the time and was on his ·way 
to a class which started at the University at 8:00 A.:JL, 
(R. 109-110). At the ti1ne of the accident he ·was residing 
at 851 East 5th South, (R. 109). He had left his home 
and driven east on 5th South to lOth East where he 
1nade a left turn and went north on lOth East to the point 
where there is an entrance to the 5th South curve. At this 
point he came to a full stop at the stop sign and waited 
for several eastbound cars to pass. He then 1nade a 
turn from his stopped position to go east on 5th South, 
and in doing so, turned into the inside lane on 5th South, 
(R. 111). At that time the sun had a tendency to throw 
a glare on the far right side of his windshield. It did not 
block his view ahead and he could see clearly in his lane 
of traffic, (R. 111-112). He was looking straight ahead, 
(R. llG). He was traveling at a speed of about 25 miles 
per hour, (R. 112) with the left side of his car possibly 
3-4 feet south of the island, (R. 117), when he observed 
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the plaintiff about 10 feet ahead of the right front fender 
of his car, (R. 112-113). He immediately applied the 
brakes and swerved to the right and thought his vehicle 
may have n1oved a foot or two to the right before the 
impact. From the time he first observed the woman until 
the time of the accident she was running to the north, and 
at the time of the impact she was possibly 5 or 6 feet 
south of the island, (R. 112-113). She rolled over the top 
of the left front fender and over to the left side of the car, 
but never came back as far as the windshield. He stopped 
his car within a distance of possibly two car lengths, not 
more, (R. 113). Either an ann or a leg of the plaintiff 
was on the island, and the rmnainder of the body wa~ 
south of the island, (R. 114). He did not tell the plaintiff 
that he had not seen her because the sun was in his eyes, 
(R. 114-115). He thought it was the glare of the sun 
on the right side of his windshield that prevented hint 
from seeing the plaintiff until she entered the path of 
his car, (R. 118). lie further testified that prior to the 
time that the accident had occurred he had never known 
and was not aware of the fact that Koneta Court was 
even on that street, (R. 121-122). With further reference 
to the glare of the sun, he stated that as soon as he turned 
onto 5th South and his car was headed in a southeasterly 
direction, the sun was off to the southeast and he could 
see the glare. The glare became more as he made his turn 
going east but moved to the right of the vehicle, (R. 122), 
but at no time interfered with his vision directly ahead 
in the lane of traffic in which he was proceeding, (R. 123). 
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STATE:JIENT OF POI~TS 
POINT I. 
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE WAS PROPERLY REFUSED. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT BY IMPLICATION OR OTHER-
WISE ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT THE JURY TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDICE THAT ALL PLAINTIFF DID 
WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE 
APPROACHING VEHICLE. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGU~fENT 
POINT I. 
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE WAS PROPERLY REFUSED. 
The plaintiff's requested instruction No. 6 was an 
attempt to have the court apply the last clear chance 
doctrine to the case. The theory was that the plaintiff 
was in a position of danger fr01n which she was unable 
to free herself, that the defendant either discovered or 
by exercise of due care should have discovered her peril, 
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and at that tiu1e had n clear opportunity to avoid the 
accident but failed to avail himself of such opportunity. 
rnder the facts as presented in this case the court prop-
erly refused this requested instruction. 
The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff stopped 
at the ditch on the south side of the street, looked to 
the northwest for approaching eastbound traffic, and 
then without 1naking any further observations whatso-
ever, rapidly ·walked or ran in a diagonal northeasterly 
direction across the street. She did not see the car and 
\vas not conscious of its presence or approach until the 
mornent of the i1npact. Because of the center island pro-
ceeding all the way down the street, the only source frmn 
which the plaintiff could anticipate any trouble until she 
reached the center island was from vehicles proceeding 
in an easterly dii·ection along 5th South Street. None 
theless, she wholly failed to make any observations for 
such vehicles after leaving the ditch on the south side of 
5th South Street. It is undisputed that at the time of the 
accident the defendant's vehicle was in the inside lane 
for eastbound traffic, which would mean that the plaintiff 
rapidly walked or ran approximately 20 feet before she 
would enter the lane in which the defendant's vehicle 
was traveling. There is no testimony by any witnesses 
that the defendant vvas traveling at any excessive rate of 
speed. His own testi1nony was approximately 25 miles 
per hour. The plaintiff's witness, Jacobs, said that the 
vehicle was traveling approximately 30 miles an hour, 
but this was what all vehicles traveled from his obser-
vations in going east up the highway. The brake marks 
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and the stopping distance would certainly indicate no 
speed beyond 25 miles per hour. The defendant testified 
that although he had clear vision in his own lane of traf-
fic, his view to the right was obscured by the rays of the 
sun which at that time of the morning would be south and 
east of his course of travel and shining toward the right 
side of his car. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was not 
crossing the street in any n1arked crosswalk, and the 
court ruled that she was not crossing the street at an un-
Inarked crosswalk at an intersection. The plaintiff's 
counsel is evidently satisfied with this ruling of the lower 
court as no issue is made thereon in connection with his 
brief on appeal. The defendant, notwithstanding the 
glare of the sun to the right of his car, observed the plain-
tiff as soon as she cmne into the path of his vehicle oppo-
site the right front fender, at which time she was running 
and his vehicle was only about 10 feet away. He lin-
mediately applied his brakes and t;werved to the right 
and thought he Ina~· have turned his vehicle 2 feet to the 
right before the actual iuqmct occurred. The plaintiff 
eontinued rapidly walking or running during all of this 
ti1ne. 
This court in the case of Graham v. Johnson, 109 
Utah 346, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, 109 Utah 365, 172 Pac. (2d) 
665, in comn1enting upon the application of the last clear 
chance doctrine, cites with approval from Chapter 17, 
Sections -!79 and 480 of Volume 2 of Restatement of the 
Law or Torts, and in the course of its opinion said: 
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"In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's 
neligence has become in a sense fixed and realiz-
able and on to this state of things defendant ap-
proaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and 
in control of the danger. 
* * * * 
"One should not be held liable for failing t n 
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a 
situation where it is speculative as to whether h(' 
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In 
a. situation where both parties are on the m01:e the 
s~gnificance of the word 'clear' is most important. 
Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the 
effect of one's negligence on a party not negligent. 
That party's negligence only arises when it is 
definitely established that there was ample tin1P 
and opportunity to avoid the accident which wa~ 
not taken advantage of." (Emphasis added.) 
The facts in the Graham case were somewhat in dis-
pute, but it was clear that the defendant in that case knew 
of the presence of the minor on the street as she ap· 
proached and also knew that the minor was unaware of 
her approach. Each of these items are wholly lacking in 
the present case. 
We quote from page 358, Chapter 17, Section 480 of 
the Restatmnent of the Law of Torts as follows: 
"It is not enough that the defendant should 
see the plaintiff in a position which would be 
dangerous were the plaintiff not aware of what is 
going on. The defendant must also realize or 
have reason to realize that the plaintiff is inatten-
tive and, therefore, is in peril. The defendant 
is entitled to assume tlzat the plaintiff is payin!l 
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or wiJll pay reasonable attention to his surra u nd-
ings; until he has reason to suspect the contrar)·, 
he has no reason to believe that the plaintiff is in 
any danger. ***" (Emphasis added.) 
ln this case even had the defendant seen the plain-
tiff when she started to cross the street, he would have 
had the right to assume that she "\vould keep a lookout 
and would yield the right of way to his vehicle. 
In Beckstrom 'L'. Williams, 3 Utah (2d) :210, :2S:2 Par. 
( 2d) 309, a two and one-half ton tractor was pulling onto 
the side of the road from a private drive~way. The de-
fendant was proceeding south. The plaintiff stopped the 
heavy tractor before entering the highway to see if it was 
clear. At this time the defendant's vehicle was approxi-
mately 325 feet away. The plaintiff then proceeded ~with 
the tractor 5 feet out onto the hard surfaced portion of 
the road and came to a stop, at which time according to 
the evidence the defendant's vehicle was still 125 feet 
away. The defendant had 16 feet of highway to the east 
of the tractor to avoid the accident. In applying the 
last clear chance doctrine, the court in that case said 
that three conditions must exist: 
"(A) that plaintiff was in a danger from 
which he could no longer extricate himself, (B) 
that defendant knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care should have known. that plaintiff was so 
endangered, and (C) that defendant thereafter, 
by exercise of reasonable care, could have avoided 
injuring the plaintiff." 
In discussing the application of the first point, (A), the 
Supreme Court stated that when the heavy tractor start-
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ed out onto the highway into the lane of traffic in which 
the defendant was proceeding, or at least by the tin1e it 
stopped in that lane, that the plaintiff then was in a posi-
tion of peril, and that the defendant's truck was then 125 
feet away. 
In our own case in considering point (A), the plain-
tiff ·was in no position of peril from which she was unable 
to extricate herself until she started to cross the patl1 
of the autmnobile. Prior thereto she could have stopped, 
yielded the right of way to the vehicle and entirely avoid-
ed the accident. vVhen she entered the path of the car, 
at n1ost not more than one second would have elapsed 
until the tirne of the irnpact, during '''hich time and at 
the speed at which the defendant was traveling he wa~ 
then too close to avoid the accident. 
In speaking of the application of point (B) to the 
facts in the Beckstrom case, the court said that when the 
defendant was at least 250 feet away, the plaintiff'~ 
tractor was onto the hard surface and moving forward 
across the highway in full view of the defendant. How-
ever, it added this important factor: 
"Concededly until the tractor was actually 
in the lane of traffic, defendant cmtld reasonably 
expect that it would stop. But when the tractor 
continued forward, defendant was bound to know 
that the driver of such a cumbersome machine 
could not, in the few seconds required for defend-
ant's truck to reach the spot, get out of the way 
and avoid an accident." (Emphasis added.) 
In this case when the plaintiff entered the lane in 
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which the defendant's car was traveling, it was then too 
late for the defendant to avoid the accident. The defend-
ant's vehicle 1nust then have heen within approxi1nately 
10-25 feet at 1nost of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff could 
not stop her forward course, it would be wholly unreason-
able to anticipate or expect that the driver of a motor 
\Tehicle in that short ti1ne and distance could have avoided 
eolliding with the plaintiff ... AJl he could possibly do was 
to atternpt to apply the brake and turn to the right. This 
he did. 
In considering the application of point (C), or the 
question whether the defendant had a clear chance to 
avoid the collision, the court in the Beckstron1 case said: 
"There can be no doubt that it 1nust be a fair 
and clear opportunity, and not just a bare possi-
bility. The defendant cannot be pllt into the posi-
tion of having to make precise calculation and 
1'nanipulation to a1:oid the accident, nor mu-st it re-
quire exceptional agility or skill. The chance must 
be such that an average individual using ordinary 
care \vould have a real opportunity to perceive 
the danger to plaintiff, to realize his inability to 
escape and thereafter to avoid the hann." (Em-
phasis added) 
The court also cited with approval frmn Morby v. 
Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 Pac. (2d) 231, as follows: 
"There is no doubt but that in order for the 
question to be properly subinitted to a jury, the 
evidence must be such as \vould reasonably sup-
port a finding that there was a fair and clear op-
portunity, in the exercise of reasonable care, to 
avoid the injury. It would no-t be sufficient 
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that it appear frorn h~n.dsight that by some pos-
sible safety measure, or even by reasonable care, 
the defendant by 'the skin of his teeth' could hrrue 
avoided the collision." (Emphasis added.) 
In considering the application of point (C) to the 
facts in the Beckstrom case, the court stated that by the 
defendant's own testimony his speed was 40 miles per 
hour; that at such speed his car could have been brought 
to a stop, including nonnal reaction time within 126 feet, 
and that when the plaintiff's tractor first entered the 
road, the car \vas then 325 feet away and could thereforP 
have been stopped 200 feet short of the point of impact. It 
then went on to say that the defendant was not obliged 
to realize the plaintiff was in inextricable peril at thi~ 
point, but only after the vehicle had got onto the highway. 
but then said at that point the defendant's vehicle was 125 
feet away and could have stopped including reaction tiine 
within 126 feet or could have turned out onto the 16 feet 
of unobstructed road. 
No such facts are present in the instant case. Frorn 
the time that the plaintiff, while either rapidly walking 
or running, entered the path of the defendant's vehicle, 
the defendant's vehicle at most would have been only 10-
25 feet away fr01n plaintiff. Traveling at a speed of 25 
miles per hour, the defendant would barely have time to 
react to the situation before the impact occurred. His own 
testimony is that he did apply the brakes and swerve to 
the right and that he probably turned 2 feet before the 
actual ilnpact occurred. Certainly, under these facts it 
would be wholly irnpossible to say that the defendant 
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had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident after the 
plaintiff rapidly walked or ran into the path of his car. 
Counsel has indicated that there was nothing in the lane 
to the right. Therefore, there ·was nothing to have pre-
vented the plaintiff frmn stopping prior to the ti1ne that 
8he ran into the path of the vehicle. IIad she done so, 
the accident would not have occurred. After she ran into 
the path of the vehicle, the defendant had no clear oppor-
tunity to avoid the accident, and the last clear chance 
doctrine does not apply. 
Counsel in his brief argues that the plaintiff was in 
peril frmn the ti1ne that she started to cross the street 
because she was unaware. This is not true, and, as indi-
cated in the Beckstrmn case, her peril only com1nenced 
when she entered the path or lane in ·which the defend-
ant's autmnobile was traveling. At any tin1e prior there-
to she could have avoided the accident cmnpletely had she 
been exercising any care whatsoever. 
In llforby v. Rogers, supra, the facts were entirely 
different to those in the present case. The defendant had 
first observed the boy on a bicycle traveling in the same 
direction as the car when the defendant was 300 feet 
away. At a distance of 200 feet the defendant sounded 
his horn. The boy on the bicycle at no tune gave any 
indication that he heard the horn. The defendant contin-
ued on until within 78 feet of the boy, but actually took no 
safety measures until within 20 feet of the boy, notwith-
standing the fact that at the speed at which he was travel-
ing he could have stopped within 43 feet, or 35 feet short 
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of striking the boy. The boy in that case for a distance of 
300 feet was entirely in the lane of travel in which the 
automobile was proceeding. The plaintiff in our case 
was not in the lane of travel of the automobile until just 
an instant before the impact occurred. Using the stop-
ping distance referred to in the ~iorby case, traveling at 
a speed of 25 miles per hour, the defendant, assuming 
a normal reaction tiine, would travel 27¥2 feet, and it 
\ronld take an additional 35 feet, or a total stopping di"-
tance of 62¥2 feet. By no stretch of the iinagination can 
it be argued that the defendant in the instant case had 
any such distance within ·which to react after the plaintiff 
ran into the path of his car. 
Counsel for the plaintiff also refers to the case of 
Trinn 'L'. Read, 8 Utah 2d 394, 335 Pac. (2d) 627. The 
facts in that case are wholly dissimilar fron1 those in this 
case. In that case there was evidence that the plaintiff 
had driven his horse onto the highway in front of the 
defendant in the smne lane of travel in which the defend-
ant was proceeding for a distance of 30 rods or approxi-
mately 495 feet. During all of this time the horse would 
have been in view of the defendant as it was in his lane 
of travel. As we have heretofore indicated, the plaintiff 
in this case was never in the lane of travel of the defend-
ant's vehicle until she suddenly rapidly walked or ran in 
front of the car, at which time the defendant's car was too 
close to either stop or otherwise act to avoid the accident. 
See Cumpton L Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., 120 Utah 
4G3, 235 Pac. (2d) 515. In that case _the plaintiff wa~ 
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walking along the side of a railroad track as a train ap-
proached. The court in that case in speaking of the last 
clear chance doctrine, stated that it only applied: 
"* * * only if the plaintiff's negligence 
has come to rest and plaintiff is thereafter unable 
by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care 
to avoid the injury herself. The deceased in this 
case was not under those circumstances of in-
extricable peril. The fact is that at any instant 
np to the time she was actually struck, she could 
by the exercise of ordinary reasonable care, have 
apprehended the presence of the train, and by tak-
ing one step to the side, have avoided her tnjury." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Exactly the same situation is presented in the instant 
case. Until the time that the plaintiff crossed in front 
of the path of the defendant's vehicle, she could, by the 
exercise of ordinary care, have observed the presence 
of the automobile and yielded the right of way to it and 
thereby completely avoided the accident. The court in the 
Compton case made this further significant statement: 
.. We have never held that a mere continuance 
of the same inattentive negligence created a situ.a-
tion of inextricable peril. When the injured per-
son's negligence has not cmne to rest, as it had in 
the above cases, so that by the exercise of reason-
able care she would have been able to avoid the 
peril at any time up to the Inoment of injury, the 
injury is then the result of the concurring negli-
gence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The one 
was just as much the poximate cause as the other. 
Ryan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 
71. Harper on Torts, Sec. 139, page 306, considers 
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the situation of the negligent defendant and the 
negligent plaintiff where the defendant is unaware 
of plaintiff's peril and states: '***It follows, thus, 
that the doctrine of last clear chance does not i11r 
elude cases in which a plaintiff has the physical 
and mental ability to avoid the risk up to the 
moment of the harm. His 'continuing' negligence, 
as it is sometimes called, continues to insulate the 
defendant's negligence, and the ordinary rule of 
contributory negligence governs the case.' " (Em-
phasis added.) 
rrhe plaintiff's negligence in this case continued right 
up to the point until she rapidly walked or ran into the 
path of the car, and at this time the defendant had no 
clear opportunity to avoid any accident. 
In the case of Marcellin v. Osguthorpe, 9 Utah 2d 1, 
336 Pac. (2d) 779, the lJtah Supreme Court again had 
the opportunity to consider the last clear chance doctrine. 
In that case the court said : 
"There is no certainty that he ever actually 
got into a situation of inextricable peril. Less so 
is there any certainty that defendant either did, 
or would be obliged to, so realize in time to save 
him from injury. There is no reason to assume 
that the defendant had to apprehend that the 
plaintiff would not see the Cadillac which was in 
plain sight on the highway in front of him with 
the tail lights on; nor that he would continue at a 
negligent rate of speed; nor that he would fail to 
guide his car safely between the other two. There 
actually was room to clear by several feet on either 
side. On the contrary, defendant could reasonably 
expect (and undoubtedly hoped) that as plaintiff 
approached these two cars he would heed the situ-
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ation ahead and moderate his speed. He could 
reasonably continue to so expect as long as there 
remained opportunity to do so. Plaintiff's argu-
ment that defendant should have observed from 
plaintiff's speeding approach that he was in in-
extricable peril, and should have dimmed his lights 
so plaintiff could see the Cadillac and arrest hiB 
own negligence to avoid the danger, must pre-
suppose that at any such instant he could haY<· 
avoided the collision by arresting his own negli-
gence. If plaintiff could do nothing to avert the 
collision, a fortiori, defendant could do nothing 
because his action by dimming his lights could 
only· react through the plaintiff. It follows that 
plaintiff's own negligence was a concurring proxi-
mate cause." 
In the present case there is no certainty that tlw 
plaintiff ever actually got into a situation of inextricablE> 
peril. Certainly, it cannot be said that the defendant wa~ 
obliged to realize that she did in time to save her from 
injury. He had the right to assume that she would be 
keeping a proper lookout, even had he seen her, and that 
she would exercise proper precautions for her own safety, 
particularly since she ,,·as crossing where there \Yas 
no marked crossvvalk and not at an unn1arked crosswalk 
at an intersection. As indicated in the n[arcellin case. 
the extension of the application of the doctrine would 
1~equire defendant "to assun1e that plaintiff would con-
tinue to be negligent, and based thereon to realize the 
approaching danger in tilne to avoid the sa1ne." The 
Utah Supre1ne Court in the l\[arcellin case further stated 
that the last clear chance doctrine "should not be ex-
tended beyond such cireumstances to obliterate the d~-
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fen8e of contributory negligence." Under the facts in this 
<·ase, to apply the last clear chance doctrine would com-
pletely obliterate the defense of contributory negligence. 
It "·ould pennit a plaintiff to negligently cross a street 
where there was no nmrked crosswalk, to fail to keep a 
proper lookout, to run in front of a car, and then charge 
the driver with anticipating that she would do all of these 
things, ·with anticipating that she would fail to exercise 
any precaution, and with anticipating that she would 
run directly in front of his car. 
\ r e think the facts in this case are closely akin to 
those in the case of Cox v. Th01npson, 123 "Gtah 81, 25± 
Pac. (2d) 1047, wherein a pedestrian who was walking 
east across a poorly lighted highway turned and walked 
directly into the path of the defendant's automobile. He 
was crossing where there was no marked crosswalk and 
was under the duty to yield the right of way to a vehicle 
upon the road. As indicated by the court in that case, 
if the decedent had yielded the right of way, or if he 
had looked up the road and seen the danger, the accident 
would not have occurred. The court in that case held that 
the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply. The de-
fendant first observed the decedent when he walked into 
the cone of light projecting from the automobile and then 
had no clear opportunity to avoid the accident. In the 
present case the defendant observed the plaintiff when 
she first started to cross the path of his vehicle, but then 
had no clear opportunity to avoid the accident. 
It is apparent from a review of the foregoing Utah 
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cases that the doctrine of last clear chance is never applica-
ble until a plaintiff arrives at a point as to be in peril. In 
this case the point was reached when the plaintiff started 
to cross in front of the defendant's vehicle. It is also 
clear that the doctrine of last clear chance should never be 
applied to the ordinary case in which the act creating tlw 
peril occurs practically simultaneously with the happen-
ing of the accident, and in which neither party can be said 
to have had a last clear chance thereafter to avoid the 
consequence. If the defendant, with a vehicle traveling 
25 miles per hour had a last clear chance to avoid the 
accident, then certainly it could be said with more force 
and effect that the plaintiff had the last clear chance to 
avoid the accident because all she needed to do was make 
a further observation to know that she had incorrectly 
appraised the situation, and she could easily have stop-
ped, whereas, it takes some distance within which to stop 
a moving vehicle. The plaintiff knew that the street was 
heavily traveled. She knew the danger frmn previous 
experience. The sun was not in her eyes. She was not 
concerned with traffic coming from any direction except 
that of the defendant's vehicle until she reached the 
center island. Her negligence under such circu1nstances 
in failing to 1nake any further look after leaving the ditch 
on the south side of the street was not only negligent, but 
entirely foolhardy. 
The case of Covington t·. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378. 
29± Pac. (~d) 788, is in point. In that case a nwtorcyclist 
was held guilty of contributory negligence as a 1natter 
of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. There. as in 
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the present case, the plaintiff was not faced with the duty 
of lnultiple appraiselnent as he was proceeding down 
the street nor with any road hazard of any kind, yet he 
wholly failed to see the defendant's vehicle as it was back-
ing away frorn the curb. The court in that case held that 
the plaintiff's action in failing to watch the o:aly potential 
hazard upon the road constituted contributory negligence 
as a n1atter of law. We feel that in this case the plain-
tiff's conduct in failing to watch the only potential hazard 
npon the road was likewise contributory negligence and 
that there was no roo1n for the application of the last 
clear chance doctrine. 
In Jones v. Armstrong, (Mich.) 204 N.W. 702, the 
court refused to apply the last clear chance doctrine to a 
pedestrian case where the plaintiff testified that he did 
not look after he started to cross the street but traveled 
40 feet or 1nore without ever looking again. The defend-
ant in that case did not even testify, but the court said 
that he would have had the right to suppose that the 
plaintiff would not have been completely oblivious to the 
approach of the approaching automobile and would have 
taken smne precautions for her own safety. The same 
situation is true in the present case. Even had the de-
fendant observed the plaintiff when she first started to 
cross the street, he would have no reason to anticipate 
that she would continue to run in front of his car and 
fail to yield the right of way to it. 
The plaintiff in this case seeks to charge the de-
fendant with observing the plaintiff's presence when she 
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left the curb, notwithstanding that his view to the right 
was obstructed by the glare of the sun, and then to a~­
sume that the plaintiff would continue to run into tlw 
path of the defendant's car. We submit that the la~t 
clear chance doctrine cannot apply in any case where the 
defendant's view is obstructed by darkness, glare or other 
condition \Yhich prevents him from seeing the plaintiff 
until she enters the path of his automobile. The defend-
ant in this case was driving in a lawful n1anner within 
the speed limit and had no reason to anticipate the 
presence of any person until the plaintiff was in front 
of his vehicle, and it was then too late for him to avoid 
the accident. 
See 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile La\Y & 
Practice, Part 2, Section 2803, page 393 and 394, where-
in it is said: 
"* * * \Vhile a pedestrian nmy be in a zone of 
danger as soon as he steps fr01n the sidewalk to 
the street where vehicles are passing, he is not 
then necessarily in danger fr01n any particular 
automobile. Until he reaches a point where he i~ 
in a position of peril fr01n the aut01nobile of tlw 
defendant and further progresses on his part or 
other negligent conduct will not increase his dan-
ger, his negligence in proceeding forward can only 
be regarded as a contributing proxilnate cause of 
the injury." 
See also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Aut01nobile Law 
& PraetirP, Part 2, Section 2804 at page 395: 
.. For exa1nple, a motorist cannot be held liabl£> 
under thP last clear chance doctrine where his Yie\\-
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wa8 obstructed so that he could not see plaintiff 
until it was too late to avoid injuring hin1." 
St•e also 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
.. 1(, Praetice, Part ~' Section 2806 at page -±02: 
"However, it is pennissible to assun1e that 
another will obey the law, and hence recovery un-
der the doctrine rnay not be based on a failure 
to anticipate a breach of law, ***" 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
THE PLAINTIFF'S DUTY TO YIELD TH~ RIGHT OF WAY. 
The plaintiff cmnplains of instruction 13 ( ~), (R. 
180, 167), which reads as follows: 
'' (2) A pedestrian who crosses a street at a 
point other than within a rnarked crosswalk, or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon 
the roadway." 
Reference is n1ade to Section 41-G-79 (a) F.C.A. 1953, 
which is substantially the smne as the portion of the in-
struction to which the objection is rnade. Section 41-6-80 
(a) U.C.A. 1953 then provides that even though a pedes-
trian rnay be required to yield the right of way, that a 
driver shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any 
pedestrian upon any roadway. Plaintiff further argues 
that the portion of the instruction as given is inconsistent 
with certain other instructions. 
In instructions No. 6 and 7 the jury was told in sub-
stance that pedestrians and motorists each had the same 
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rights to the use of public streets. Ho-wever, even though 
a pedestrian and a motorist have an equal right to the 
use of streets, one may nonetheless have the right of way 
over the other. A pedestrian in a crosswalk has the right 
of way over a motorist, even though a motorist has the 
right to use the street. By the same token, a 1notorist 
has the right of way over a pedestrian who chooses to 
cross a street where there is no crosswalk. Had thf' 
court failed to give instructions No. 6 and 7, the plaintiff 
would then have argued that the court led the jury to 
believe that the plaintiff could not cross a street outside 
a crosswalk. The plaintiff did have a right to use the 
street and did have a right to cross a street outside of a 
crosswalk, but, nonetheless, when she attempted to do 
so, she was under the necessity of yielding the right of 
way to vehicles, and it was, therefore, proper for the 
court to instruct the jury as it did in instruction No. 13 
(2). 
The appellant clai1ns that the expression: "failed 
to yield the right of way" without 1nore is an erroneous 
statement of the law. \Vith this we cannot agree. In the 
first place, it is the language used in the statute, and in 
the second place, that instruction in abnost identical 
language has heretofore been approved by this court in 
the case of Okud,a 'Z:. Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 Pac. (~d) 
~Si. In that case a jury returned a verdiet of no cause 
of action in a suit in which a pedestrian had been killed. 
The instruction on contributory negligence to which the 
appellant objected in that ea~e read as follow8: 
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.. You are instructed that the deceased in the 
exercise of ordinary care, and in order not to be 
guilty herself of contributory negligence, was 
governed by the following rules of law at the time 
and place in question. 
* * * 
"3. You are instructed that a pedestrian 
erossing a roadway at any point other than within 
a 1narked crosswalk or within an un1narked cross-
walk at an intersection should yield the right of 
way to all vehicles lawfully upon the highway. 
Therefore, it was the duty of said deceased to 
yield the right of way to vehicles upon the street 
if you find that she was crossing or commencing 
to cross the street under the above circumstances." 
In the present case the physical facts definitely prove 
that the defendant's vehicle was so close as to constitute 
a har.ard and that the plaintiff should have yielded to it. 
There is no evidence in this case to indicate that the de-
fendant was traveling along the street at a speed greater 
than 25-30 1niles per hour. Considering that from the 
tilne the plaintiff left the ditch on the south side of 5th 
Routh Street and either rapidly walked or ran in a north-
erly direction and that her path and that of the vehicle 
met in the inside lane for eastbound traffic, it goes with-
out saying that the plaintiff should have yielded the right 
of way to the vehicle. She had to rapidly walk or run to 
get into the path of the vehicle which was lawfully travel-
ing on the road and at a proper rate of speed. If a pedes-
trian has to rapidly walk or run into the path of a vehicle 
which is lawfully proceeding upon the road in order to 
get into its path, it goes without saying that she failed 
to yield the right of way to that vehicle. 
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Cmnplaint is Inade that the court Ly its instruction:-: 
failed to take into consideration the qualifying provision 
of Section 41-6-80 (a) U.C.A. 1953. This is not so becausp 
the court in instruction No. 7 went on to instruct the jury 
that the driver's duty required him to be vigilant at all 
times, to keep a lookout for traffic and other condition:' 
reasonably to be anticipated, to keep his vehicle under 
such control that he could stop quickly and avoid an acei-
dent, and then stated that this duty continued even 
though the defendant had the right of way. This fully 
eovered the situation as presented in Section ±1-G-79 (a) 
1 ~.C.A. 1953 and Section 41-6-80 (a) r.C.A. 1953. 
Reference is Inade to the case of Coombs v. Perry. 
2 Ctah 2d 381, 275 Pac. (2d) 680. That case is not in point 
because it involved a situation where the plaintiff pedes-
trian was in a regular n1arked crosswalk in the Iniddle 
of an intersection. She was proceeding in the crosswalk 
in a ·westerly direction across Washington Boulevard and 
on reaching the middle of the street, stopped and looked 
to the north, but saw no southbound vehicles approaching 
and took a fe·w steps westward when she suddenly became 
aware of the approach of the defendant's car. In that 
case a jury verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff 
and the defendant appealed, clai1ning that the plaintiff 
had failed to prove negligence on the part of the defend-
ant, and that as a matter of law the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributon· negligenee. In considering the cases cited 
by defen~C' rounsel, the court recognized the distinction 
between ra~es in \Yhich the pedestrian "·as in a rrosswalk 
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and where the pedestrian wa~ crossing where there was 
no crosswalk, and said: 
.. * * * But cases, cited h~- defendant ·which 
involve accidents occurring outside of lawfully 
designated crosswalks are for that reason distin-
guishable frmn the instant one; ***" 
Ureat e1nphasis was laid upon the fact that the pedes-
trian was in a Inarked crosswalk and "hacl the right of 
way." The court further stated that right of way simply 
meant: 
··that if hYo persons are so proceeding that if they 
continued their course there would be danger of 
collision, the disfavored one *** Inust give way, 
and the favored one *** Inay proceed; and the 
favored one *** may assume that this will be 
done." 
ln the instant case the plaintiff was not in a cross-
\valk, and the defendant was the favored person. Apply-
ing the concept of right of way as defined by the Supreme 
Court, the facts proved that the plaintiff and the pedes-
trian continuing in their course not only constituted the 
danger of a collision but actually precipitated one. The 
defendant, therefore, had the right of way over the plain-
tiff. In its opinion in that case the court states that the 
plaintiff, since she was in a crosswalk and had the right 
of way, even had she seen the car, would have been en-
titled to assume that the car would yield the right of 
way to her. The same situation 1nust apply to the defend-
ant in the instant case-that even had he seen the plain-
tiff, he could make the same assumption that she would 
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stop and yield the right of way to him. "\Vhen she rapidly 
walked or ran into his path, it was then too late for him 
to avoid the accident. 
This is also the decision of the Utah Suprerne Court 
in the case of Hess 1-'. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pae. 
(2d) 510, which is cited with approval in the Coomb~ 
case, and wherein it was held that even though the plain-
tiff driving southward toward an intersection was negli-
gent in not seeing an an1bulance come into the intersec-
tion frorn the west, that he was entitled to assume that 
the mnbulance would stop for a stop sign and that he wa~ 
entitled to proceed until it becmne apparent to him that 
the ambulance was not going to do so. 
In commenting upon the case of Coombs 1/. Perry. tlw 
appellant quotes an excerpt to the effect that the plain-
tiff under the facts as indicated in that case was not 
obliged to focus her full and undivided attention on any 
particular car. However, in that case she was in a cross-
walk and the court indicates she might have to watch 
for other pedestrians in the crosswalk and rernain awarl:' 
of the possibility of other traffic. That is not the situa-
tion at all as presented in the instant case. The facts 
in our case are strikingly silnilar to those in the case of 
Sant 'l'. llliller, 115 rtah 559, 206 Pac. (2d) 719. In that 
case the plaintiff was crossing a street outside of a 
crosswalk and wa::-; walking in a diagonal southwesterly 
direction arross the street. On rearhing a point 8 feet 
we~t of the center line, the plaintiff wa~ struck by tlw 
defendant'~ car. The trial eourt directed a verdirt in 
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favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a nratter of law. 
'rhis verdict was upheld by the Suprerne Court. Further-
more in that case the Suprerne Court held that the doc-
trine of last clear chance did not apply. The court placed 
Pmphasis upon the fact that a rnotorist was not apt to 
expect pedestrians to be crossing a street at this point, 
and that in "a rnoving situation, *** he rnight reasonably 
anticipate a person would stop before n1oving into the 
path'' of his vehicle. The court also indicated that the 
plaintiff knew he 'vas leaving a place of safety to travel 
a hazardous course across the road and \Yas cutting 
diagonally across the street; that after he crossed the 
eenter line, he was not concerned with traffic coming from 
any direction except the north. The court then said: 
·•Appellant teas aware of the fact that he was 
taking a chance in crossing the street a.t a place 
contrary to law. He sho·uld also hrn:e known that 
a driver of a vehcile would not ordinarily antici-
pate the presence of pedestrians on the street at 
the time and place of the accident. l{nowing that 
his presence might not be anticipated and knowing 
that traffic on the west side of the road was ap-
proaching from the north and with nothing of im-
portance to distract his attention, it was appel-
lant's duty to watch the traffic he knew was ap-
proaching his location. *** Having omitted to 
continue to watch, he failed to exercise the degree 
of care requ~red of a pedestrian who leaves a place 
of safety and places himself ~n a position of peril. 
A greater degree of care ~s necessary upon the 
part of a pedestrian who undertakes to cross a 
city street at a prohibited place than is placed 
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on one who uses a marked crosswalk. And espe-
cially is this true, 1vhen because of darkness and 
climatic conditions, the opportunity for drivers 
to clearly discern the presence of individuals on 
the roadway is greatly restricted. It is ·not due 
care for a person to fail to observe ·what Inight bt-
approaching danger when there is no necessity 
to look elsewhere. Appellant was not confronted 
with a situation 1vhich distracted his attention or 
which precluded him from continuously ohserYir~g 
the on-coming traffic and his curiosity to ''yatch 
the movement of his friends is not sufficient to 
excuse him for his delict. Reasonable care die-
tates that while appellant ''yas crossing the west 
portion of the street, he should have been observ-
ant of the movement of this traffic south on tht' 
street. He apparently disregarded potential dan-
ger for unin1portant reasons." (En1phasis added.) 
In the instant case the plaintiff knew that 5th South 
Street, particularly at that time of the n1orning, was a 
heavily traveled street. She had encountered difficulty 
in getting across the street on other occasions because 
\ 
of traffic. In fact, it had been discussed between her 
and the driver of the car that he would cmne around and 
pick her up on her side of the street so as to obviate the 
necessity of her crossing the street at that point, but she 
replied it was not necessary. Because of the island in 
the center of the street, the only direction frmn 1vhich 
traffic could be anticipated was that traveling east. The 
plaintiff "'as aware of the approach of an eastbound car, 
but, nonetheless, rapidly walked or ran in a diagonal 
direction across the street without paying any further 
heed thereto. She was adu1ittedly not crossing the street 
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m a <·ro~~walk and n1ight therefore anticipate that a 
motorist would not be likely to be expecting her upon the 
street at that point. She should have known that the 
::~un n1ight be in the eye8 of eastbound 1notorists, but there 
\\·as no sun in her eyes and nothing to prevent her frmn 
looking to the west or in the only direction frmn which 
traffic could be anticipated. She was not in a crosswalk 
and therefore was not concerned with the presence of 
other pedestrians that might be in the area. She had 
erossed that street every day five tilnes a week for several 
uwnths prior to the accident and therefore was fully 
familiar with the type of the surface and did not have 
to look for any obstructions or defects therein. Her sole 
attention, as indicated in the Sant case, should have been 
directed to the west until she reached the center island 
and had she done this, it would have become readily ap-
parent to her that she could not safely cross the street, 
and she could easily have stopped and yielded the right 
of way to the vehicle as required by law. See also Cov-
ington, v. Carpenter, supra. 
Appellant also complains of that portion of instruC-
tion No. 13 (3) which states that a pedestrian who crosses 
a street outside of a marked cross walk or within a 
marked crosswalk at an intersection is required to exer-
cise 1nore care and caution than in crossing in a pedes-
trian lane. This is a proper statement of the law, and in 
the case of Sant v. Miller supra, the court, as indicated in 
a part of the quotation previously cited, specifically 
stated that a greater degree of care was placed upon a 
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pedestrian who attempts to cross a street at a point out-
side a crosswalk. 
The n1eaning which the appellant attempts to give to 
the court's instructions is not only strained but far 
fetched. The court's instructions clearly indicated that 
the plaintiff had a right to cross the street, even outside 
a crosswalk, but further informed the jury that if tlw 
plaintiff crossed a street outside a crosswalk, she had to 
yield the right of way and had to exercise more diligence 
than if she was crossing in a pedestrian lane. The court 
specifically instructed the jury on the defendant's duty 
to keep a proper lookout and travel at a proper speed, 
and specifically stated that such duty continued even 
though the defendant had the right of way over the plain-
tiff. Under these instructions even though the plaintiff 
failed to yield the right of way to the defendant, it was up 
to the jury to determine whether such negligence on her 
part was a proxilnate cause of the accident, or whether 
the negligence, if any, on the part of the defendant was 
the proxirnate cause of the accident. \Ye do not see how 
these issues could have been Inore clearl~T presented to the 
jury than they were done in the instant case. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT BY IMPLICATION OR OTHER-
WISE ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT THE JURY TO THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PREJUDICE THAT ALL PLAINTIFF DID 
WAS TO MERELY GLANCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE 
APPROACHING TRAFFIC. 
On this point the appellant refers to the court's in-
struetion No. 13 (1 ), (R. 180), which wa~ ·:with referenef' 
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to the plaintiff's duty to look and observe whether there 
were an~- antmnobiles in such close proxi1nity as to affect 
her safety and to eontinue to keep such a reasonable and 
prudent lookout as was reasonably necessary for her pro-
te<'tion. The instruction then stated that "a 1nere glance 
in the direction of the approaching autmnobile is not 
:-;uffieient.'' The appellant claims that by this portion of 
the instruction the trial judge indicated to the jury that 
all the plaintiff did was 1nerely glance in the direction 
of the approaching autmnobile. The instruction is not 
:-;usceptible to any such interpretation, but even if it were, 
the matter was cured by the court's instruction ~ o. 1, 
(R. 168), in which the court said: 
"1~he court has no opinion, and does not seel\: 
to express any in these instructions with respect 
to what the facts are. It is your sole prerogative 
to determine the facts frmn the evidence." 
\Ve subnrit that the instruction contains a correct 
state1nent of the law and that certainly a mere glanc~ 
in the direction of the approaching automobile is not 
sufficient. The court did not state that the plaintiff 
made a 1nere glance, but outlined what type of a lookout 
the plaintiff had to keep, and, as indicated by this court 
in the case of Mingus v. Olsson, 114: Utah 505, 201 Pac. 
(2d) 495, a 1nere glance in the direction of an approaching 
automobile is not sufficient. 
Under the facts in this case the jury could well have 
found that all the plaintiff did was to take a mere glance. 
It is doubtful whether she ever saw the defendant's auto-
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nwbile because the vehicle which she saw had not yet 
reached the curve, and she could not state whether it 
was going south on 5th South Street or coming around 
the curve. This obviously could not have been the defend-
ant's vehicle. Furthermore, she did not see the vehicle 
long enough to 1nake any estimate as to its speed. Cer-
tainly, her estin1ate as to its distance was erroneou:-:. 
There was no evidence to indicate that the vehicle \\'a~ 
traveling 1nore than 25-30 miles per hour, and it is un-
disputed that while the plaintiff rapidly walked or ran 
20 feet frmn the curb, she and the vehicle crossed paths. 
At the trial we felt and still feel that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law by 
failing to look again to the west for approaching east-
bound traffic after leaving the south curb line and in 
failing to yield the right of way to the vehicle. The type 
of lookout which she maintained was a n1atter for the jury 
to decide under the court's instructions. This was fully 
covered in the court's instruction, and it was properly 
indicated that a mere glance would not be sufficient. 
There was evidence upon which the jury could find that 
all the plaintiff did was take a quick glance and failed 
to properly evaluate the situation. This is perfectly evi-
dent frmu the 1nanner in which the accident occurred. Th~ 
court did not b:· any stretch of the i1nagination instruct 
the jnr.'· that all the plaintiff did was take a 1nere glance, 
but informed thein that if that \nl~ all she did do, she 
failed to keep a proper lookout. The factual question wati 
left to the ;jnr:· for decision. There could have been no 
prejudiee in an:· event in view of plaintiff's admission 
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that she failed to look again as she crossed the street. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
l ~ nder this heading and aside frmn the error there-
tofore clai1ned by the appellant in other portions of the 
brief, the only contention Inade is that the negligence of 
the defendant ·was the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent. 
Appellant again refers to the defendant's testimony 
and indicates that the defendant traveled in the south 
lane for some distance before turning into the north lane. 
This confusion on the appellant's part is again due to the 
markings, C-1 and C-2 as placed upon the diagra1n. They 
were placed by the witness, Myers. C-2 indicated the posi-
tion of the defendant's car according to the witness, 
.Myers, when an unidentified eastbound vehicle was at 
the point indicated by C-1 on the diagrmn. No one testi-
fied that the defendant's car was ever in the position C-1 
as shown on the diagram. The only testimony in the case 
as bearing on this point is the defendant's testimony that 
as he 1nade the turn from lOth East onto 5th South Street 
he proceeded directly into the inside lane and continued 
in that lane up to the moment of the impact. The glare 
of the sun to the right of his car interfered with his vision 
to the right but not with his vision straight ahead, and he 
saw the plaintiff as soon as she rapidly ran into the path 
of his car and when she was 10 feet away and on a line 
with the right front fender. At that time he applied 
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his brakes and swerved to the right, and had probably 
traveled 2 feet to the right at the tirne of the ilnpact. 
There was also evidence fron1 the witness, Larson, that 
the irnpact occurred s01newhere between the hood emblem 
in the center of the car and the left front fender. Beariw~· 
all of these points in rnind, the plaintiff fr01n the tirue slw 
entered the path of the defendant's vehicle could not haYP 
traveled more than 3-4 feet at rnost before she 'Yas struck 
by the car. The vddth of the car ,,-ould not be rnore than 
6 feet, and the car itself had turned 2 feet to the right 
at the tin1e that the irnpact occurred. The defendant un-
der such circurncstanes when the peril first became ap-
parent to hirn had no opportunity w"lmh;oever to ayoid 
the accident. 
Counsel again rnakes reference to the case of Comnbs 
1:. Perry7 supra, and attempts to in1ply that if the de-
fendant had seen the plaintiff at the curb, he should havP 
known that she ·would throv{ all caution to the wind and 
run into the path of his car. This is not the law and i~ 
not the stateruent contained in Coombs r. Perry. That 
case, as we have heretofore noted, involved a pedestrian 
who was in a crosswalk and for that reason is not in 
point. Furtherrnore, the court did not atternpt to chargP 
the defendant with any knowledge of danger until the 
plaintiff had crossed the center line of "\Yashington Boule-
vard. As we have heretofore seen in this case, the de-
fendant, even had he seen the plaintiff. would not have 
anticipated any peril or known that tlw plaintiff would 
foolhardily run into the path of his car. 
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Counsel quotes from Coornhs u. Perry to show that if 
the plaintiff had seen the defendant's car approaching, 
~he would have the right to asstune that the defendant 
would yield the right of way to her. This is wholly untrue 
under the facts of this case. In the Comnbs rase the 
plaintiff \Yas in a crosswalk, and if she had seen the de-
fendant'~ car approaching, had the right to assume that 
the defendant would yield the right of way to her. How-
t>Yer, in the present case the plaintiff was not in a cross-
walk and would have no right to nmke an~· such assump-
tion, hut was under the obligation of continuing to keep 
a lookout in the only direction frmn whieh rars were pro-
c•eeding, to-wit: frmn the west traveling east. It was then 
her duty to yield the right of way and not the duty of 
the defendant to yield the right of way to her. In fact, 
the language quoted by appellant frmn the Comnbs case 
would apply to the defendant under the eiretunstances 
of this case. Since the defendant had the right of way, 
even had he seen the plaintiff, he would have been en-
titled to assunte that the plaintiff would have yielded 
the right of way to hiin. While the defendant's view to 
the right and beyond the inunediate path of his car was 
obstructed by the sun, the plaintiff's view was not ob-
~tructed at all as she would be looking away frmn the sun. 
Had she looked as she continued to cross the street, she 
would have realized the danger, stopped and yielded 
the right of way to the defendant, and the accident would 
never have occurred. 
Counsel again makes reference to the case of W inn 
t'. Read, supra, but, as we have heretofore pointed out, 
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that case is not in point. If the plaintiff in that case had 
traveled 30 rods down the road in a direct line of vision 
and in the same lane of traffic as the defendant before 
the in1pact occurred, then, of course, the defendant should 
have been aware of his presence in that lane during all 
that period of time. Ho·wever, in the instant case the 
plaintiff did not cross into the path of the defendant'::; car 
until it was too late for the defendant to do anything to 
avoid the accident. The questions of the defendant'~ 
negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence and 
whether either proxirnately caused the accident were sub-
mitted to the jury under appropriate instructions. 
At the tirne of the trial we felt that the plaintiff wa~ 
guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of law and 
made appropriate motions both at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case and of the entire case for a directed ver-
dict. If, as the plaintiff now claims, the defendant's 
negligence as a n1atter of law ·was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident, it is indeed strange that the plain-
tiff failed to nwve for a directed verdict. \Ye feel that 
there is no rnerit whatsoever to this contention. Further-
rnore, if under the facts of this case the defendant's negli-
gencp was the sole proxirnate cause of the accident, it 
·would give license for a pedestrian to cross a dangerous 
street in faee of heavy traffic. not in a cross\Yalk, throw 
all caution to the winds, and then state that the defendant 
had the sole responsibility for avoiding the aeeident. 
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CONCLL"SIO~ 
rrhis Blatter was submitted to the jury by appropri-
ate instructions. l' nder all of the facts and considering 
the plaintiff's knowledge that it ·was hazardous to cross 
the street at this particular ti1ne and place and outside 
of any cross\valk, and considering further the admitted 
fact that the plaintiff from the ti1ne she left the south 
eurb line rapidly walked or ran diagonally across the 
street in a northeasterly direction without making any 
further observations to the west, or the only direction 
from which traffic could be anticipated, it is difficult to 
see how the jury could have returned any verdict other 
than the one which it did. 
\Ve respectfully submit that the plaintiff had a fair 
trial and that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG 
Attor-neys for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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